

























This paper considers capital movements between two countries with infinite horizons that
differ in their time preference. The paper, in particular, examines whether there exist regimes of
taxation of international borrowing that follow from optimizing behavior and are consistent with
positive consumption in the impatient country in steady state. The types of taxation regime
considered are (i) taxation by only the borrower country, (ii) taxation by only the lender country,
and (iii) taxation by both countries. For all three cases, positive consumption in steady state by the
impatient country is possible, if the two countries differ sufficiently little in their rates of time
preference.
' I thank an anonymous referee for useful comments.1
1. Introduction
Differences in time preference across countries are natural causes of international
lending and borrowing. Buiter (1981) has analyzed time preference as a source of
international capital flows in the standard overlapping generations model. In his analysis,
an international difference in time preference gives rise to a positive, but interior, level of
steady state indebtedness of the relatively impatient country. A similar result can be
obtained in a two-country version of the Blanchard (1985) model. With infinitely lived
agents, however, the awkward result is obtained that the consumption level of the
impatient country tends to zero in the long run. This well-known and unappealing result
follows in a standard two-country model without taxes on international borrowing.
This paper introduces taxation in a two country model with infinitely lived agents,
and it examines whether a regime of optimal [axes on international capital flows is
consistent with a positive steady state consumption level for the impatient country as well
as the patient country. The analysis applies to international debt flows as well as to
physical capital flows. In the present model, a country's indebtedness can only change
discretely, if there is a simultaneous off setting international movement of physical
capital, which implies that international debt and physical capital flows are closely linked.
Three types of tax regime are considered: (i) taxation by only the borrowing country, (ii)
taxation by only the lending country, and (iii) taxation by both countries. In the third
regime, there is explicit international tax competition. Generally, positive long run
consumption levels in both countries are consistent with optimal tax policy in all three
types of regime. Positive long run consumption for the impatient country is more likely,
the smaller is the difference in time preference between the two countries, and the more
sensitive is the marginal product of capital to additional capital investments.2
In an equilibrium with positive long run consumption in both countries, each
country's capital stock is separately determined by the modified golden tule.' The
difference between the gross and net return to international lending is then determined
exogenously by the two countries' difference in time pceference, if we assume that the
two countries are symmetric in other respects. For all three types of tax regime, the main
question is whether the exogenously given tax wedge is in fact optimal for a steady state
level of impatient country indebtedness that leaves this country wíth a positive consumpti-
on. The necessary tax wedge between gross and net international retun~s, determined by
the exogenously given difference in time preference, is consistent with a range of separate
debtor and creditor country tax rates in the joint taxation case. In [his case, it is interes-
ting to see how the tax wedge, and hence tax revenues, are split between the two
countries.
Following large current account deficits throughout the 1980s, the United States is
now a large net debtor country. In this context, it is sometimes suggested that the
accumulation of large Japanese claims on the United States reflects a relatively strong
impatience on the part of Americans. The analysis of this paper suggests that, in the long
run, U.S. indebtedness does not imply U.S. consumption levels will approach zero. In
particuiar, a combination of Japanese and other capital-exporting country taxes on capital
outflows and American taxes on capital inflows can discourage foreign investments in the
U.S sufficiently for the U.S. to have positive net wonh, and thus positive consumption, in
steady state. Recently, indeed, suggestions have been made in the United States to attempt
to capture additional tax revenues from foreign investments as a means to lessen the
federal budget deficit.
Previous work on international taxation focuses primarily on the relationship between
tax competition and the international location of capital for a given world stock of capital.3
Hamada (1966) and Feldstein and Horioka (1979), for example, consider the international
taxation of capital flows without taking into account saving behavior. Again, in a static
context, Bond and Samuelson (1989) compare the Nash tax rate equilibria for the cases
where the capital-exporting country provides a deduction or a credit for taxes levied by
the capital-importing country. In a dynamic setting, Ruffin (1985) considers (non-
retaliatory) taxation of international capital flows in a two-country Solow growth model,
with exogenously determined savings rates. Ghosh (1991) examines tax competitíon in a
symmetric, two-country OLG model, with the tax revenues used to finance public goods.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic two
country model of international lending. Section 3 examines the determination of tax rates,
international lending and national consumption levels in steady state. The three tax
regimes of joint taxes, and taxation of each of the two countries separately are considered
in turn. Section 4 concludes.
2. The Model
Consider a world that consists of two countries, each inhabited by a representative
agent. The two countries are identical in every respect other than their rates of time
preference. The domestic rate of time preference, p, is assumed to exceed the foreign rate
of time preference, p'. The economy's two factors of production are capital and labor.
The production function f(K, L) is homogeneous of degree one and strictly quasi-concave.
The labor force in each country is constant and in inelastic supply. Output per capita is
given by f(k), with lower case k denoting capital per capita. Capital depreciates continu-
ously at a rate b. In what follows, it is useful to define net-of-depreciation output per
capita, or f(k) - bk, as g(k).4
There is perfect international capital mobility. In particular, we assume that physical
capital can be transferred abroad or repatriated costlessly at all times. Equivalently, loans
collateralized by physical capital can be called at all times.z This obviates the incentive
for coniiscatory taxa[ion stemming from an international immobiliry of physical capital.
Let us assume that all international capital flows take the form of loans, and let z be the
per capita indebtedness of the home country. Both countries can in principle tax the
proceeds from cross-border lending. Let the home (foreign) country tax the return to
international borrowing, specifically, at a rate r (r'). The home country tax base is the
entire return to intetnational borrowings. This return equals the net-of-depreciation
marginal return to capital, or g'(k). The foreign (creditor) country allows home country
taxes to be deducted from taxable income.' The objective of either country's tax authori-
ty will be to maximize national income. There is thus no rationale for taxes other than
taxes on international capital flows. The home (debtor) country thus does not tax
domestically-owned capital, while the foreign (creditor) country does not tax any capital
located within its borders.
The representative agent in either country maximizes his intertemporal welfare that
depends on present and future consumption. The domestic representative agent, specifical-
ly, has the following intertemporal welfare objective,
~ u(c~ e -T dt (1)
where c, is per capita consumption at time t. In equation (1), u( ) is a standard concave
utiliry function.
In the absence of international capital flows, the home country's output is either
consumed or invested so that f(k,J - c, f i„ where i, is per capita gross investment. The5
per capita domestic capital stock, k„ evolves according to dk,ldt - i, - ók,. Without capital




c -f(k) -i (4)
where f'(k) - df~dk.
In (2)-(4), time subscripts are deleted to denote steady state values.
In the integrated, two-country equilibrium with capital mobiliry, foreign agents will
lend to domestic agents to the point where the after-tax returns to investment, in both
countries, are equal. The equality of after-tax returns to investment, in both countries, is
reflected by the following arbitrage relationship,
8'(k ') - (1 - r) (1 - r') 8'(k) (5)
where g'(~ - f'(k) - ó is the net-of-depreciation, marginal product of capital.'
The home and foreign countries both are assumed to return tax revenues arising from
the taxation of international capital flows in lump sum fashion to their citizens. The
steady state domestic and foreign per capita consumption levels are then given as follows,
c - 8(k) - P (6)6
c' - g(k') f P (6~)
where p-(1 - r) g'(k~z is the net-of-home country tax, per capita debt service by the
home country.
Each country, if it taxes international investments, sets its tax rate with the aim of
maximizing instantaneous national income or, equivalently, production net of depreciation
costs and of after-tax international debt service. In steady state, there is no net physical
investment, and hence, national income equals consumption as in (6) and (6'). Tax
policies are interdependent, and we assume that countries set their tax rates noncoop-
eratively. We further assume that neither country can precommit itself to a path of future
tax rates. As a result, neither country's tax policy is, generally, optimal, even though
physical capital remains fully mobile interna[ionally. The suboptimality of time-consistent
tax policies arises, because the tax authorities, at the time they set taxes, do not account
for the fact that tax policy, as foreseen by rational agents, has implications for saving and
capital accumulation decisions.
The domestic and foreign tax rates, in Nash equilibrium, solve,
r - argmax [c(r, r')J
r
r" - argmax [c'(r, r')J (7~)
r'
The steady state values of the variables c, c', k, k', r, r' and z are fully determined
by equations (5) through (7'), along with equation (2) and its foreign counterpart, if in
fact steady state domestic consumption is positive, or c~ 0. In the alternative case of c
- 0, it is no longer necessarily the case that g'(k) -~. In this instance, we can replace~
the equilibrium condition g'(k) -~ by c - 0, which again gives us a system that fully
determines all the steady state values of the variables c, c', k, k', r, r' and z. As shown
below, whether or not the outcome c- 0 is possible depends on the model parameters ~
and a' and on the nature of the production function, f.
3. Taxes in steady state
This section examines steady state tax policies and their implications for steady state
international lending and consumption in both countries. We examine three types of tax
regime: (i) only the home (debtor) country taxes international lending, (ii) only the
foreign (creditor) country taxes international lending, and (iii) both countries tax internati-
onal lending. Capital is, throughout, assumed to remain internationally mobile. In this
setting, tax authorities face a continuous sequence of instances, where taxes affect the
international location of the global capital stock, as in the static capital location model of,
for instance, Hamada (1966). We will start by assuming that, in fact, the steady state
level of home consumption, c, is positive. For this case, equation (2) applies so that g'(k)
-),. On this assumption, we can first derive the steady state values of tax policy and of
other variables of interest. For an equilibrium with c~ 0 in steady state to exist, we can
then check if the steady state value of net-of-tax debt service, P, is in fact consistent with
the assumption of c 1 0.
In the general case, the home and foreign country both tax the return to international
lending. For this case, equations (7) and (7') imply the following optimality conditions for
domestic and foreign tax policy respectively,s
r8(k) dr -8 (k) (1 -r)z dT tg'(k)z -0
- g'(k') ' 8'(k) (1 - r) t 8„(k) (1 - r) z- 0
(8)
(8')
Total differentiation of the returns arbitrage condition (5) implies that dzldr in (8) is
given by,
dz - - 8'(k) , (1 - r')
dT g~(k ~) (E { E~)
(9)
where E -- g"(1Q~8'(k) and E. -- 8„~.)~8,~.).
In what follows, it will be interesting to examine the division of tax revenues from
the taxation of international lending between the home and foreign countries. Domestic
(foreign) tax revenues, denoted R(R'), are given as follows,
R - r g ' (k) z (10)
R' - r'(1 - r) 8~(k) z (10")
The solutions for the steady state values of the variables r, r', z, R, R' and P can now
be explicitly derived in terms of the paramaters )` and ),' and the coefficients e and e'.
Note that the coefficients e and e' are evaluated at the steady state levels of the domestic
and foreign per capita capital stocks, k and k', that are determined by (2) and its foreign
equivalent, or by g'(k) -~ and by g'(k-) -~'.5
The steady state values of the variables r, r', z, R, R' and P, for the case of tax
competition, are represented in column 1 of Table 1. The tax rates r and i are shown to9
depend on the coefficients e and e' as well as on ~ and on ~'. In panicular, the larger
(smaller) the coefficient e' (e), the larger (smaller) is the home tax rate r, and the smaller
(larger) is the foreign tax rate r'. Correspondingly, the share of total tax revenues
received by the home country increases (decreases) with e' (e). For the specific case of e
- e', both countries receive equal tax revenues, i.e. R - R'. The steady state value of
net-of-tax debt service, P, is related positively to the difference ~-~', and negatively to
the sum e f e'. Equation (6) implies that domestic steady state consumption, c, declines
one-for-one with debt service, P, for a given value of g(k). Steady state domestic
consumption, c, thus is related negatively to the difference ~-~', and positively to e f
e', again, for a given value of g(k).
As a special case, we can consider the case where the two countries are symmetric in
every respect, including the rates of time preference, so that ~-~'. In this case, the
unique Nash equilibrium steady state tax rates for both countries and the international
level of debt are zero, as evident from the table. Interestingly, the present model does not
have a unique equilibrium level of international debt in the perfect symmetry case in the
absence of taxation. Then, in fact, any level of international lending consístent with non-
negative steady state levels of consumption in both countries is an equilibrium. In the
present model, the introductíon of taxes, thus, eliminates the existence of multiple steady
state levels of international debt.
It is interesting to consider the cases where only one of the two countries taxes the
return to international debt. We will consider the cases where only the home (debtor)
country, and only the foreign (creditor) country tax international lending separately. In
the first instance, the optimality condition (8') is replaced by the condition r' - 0, while
in the alternative case, condition (8) is replaced by the condition T- 0. For ei[her case,
we can again relate the steady state levels of the variables of interest to the coefficients e]0
and e', and to ~ and ~'. Column 2 of Table 1 represents the results for home country
taxation only, while column 3 assumes there is only foreign country taxation.
In column 2, the domestic tax rate T is given exogenously by (~ -~')~. The steady
state values of Z, R and P all are shown to depend positively on the difference ~-~', ánd
negatively on the ccefficient e'. Symmetrically, in column 3 the foreign tax rate r is
equal to (~ -~')~, while ~, R', and P depend positively on the difference ~- 1`', and
negatively on e.
With only a single country taxing international lending, the unique Nash equilibrium
in the full symmetry case ( including i` - ~') again implies a zero sieady state tax rate and
level of international debt. Without taxation, the steady state level of domestic internatio-
nal debt can well be positive. If it were, then the introduction of a foreign tax on
intetnational lendíng, thus, would reduce the steady state level of domestic debt service to
zero. Clearly, in this instance the introduction of a foreign tax on international lending
would reduce the foreign level of steady state consumption and welfare. At the same
time, the introduction of the foreign tax could even have reduced the foreign country's
intertemporal welfare as measured by (1). This is definitely the case for the specific
model with A' - 0.
We can now compare the steady state tax rates and other variables for the three types
of tax regime, as represented in the three colutnns of Table 1. Interestingly, the steady
state international debt level, z, is smallest with joint taxation. It follows that the two
countries' combined tax revenues, R f R', are also lowest with tax competition. This
means that a country that single-handedly taxes international capital flows, obtains higher
steady state tax revenues than the country would with joint taxation. Net-of-tax debt
service, P, is also lowest with tax competition. Finally, we have to consider how steady
state consumption levels differ across the three types of tax regime. In this regard, note11
that steady state global consumption is invariate with the rype of tax regime, as the steady
state capital stock in each country is detetmined by the modified golden rule, regardless
of the tax regime. Again, domestic (foreign) consumption decreases (increases) one-for-
one with the steady state, domestic, net-of-tax debt service, P. Comparing P across the
three tax regimes, we see that domestic (foreign) steady state consumption is highest
(lowest) with joint taxation. At the same time, domestic (foreign) steady state welfare is
highest (lowest) in the case of tax competition. Specifically, we note that domestic steady
state consumption and welfare are higher with joint taxation than with only home country
taxation. Apparently, a foreign tax engenders the home country to borrow less so that
domestic steady state consumption and welfare can be higher.
Until now we have considered the economy's steady state, on the assumption that
domestic steady state consumption is positive. To see whether such an outcome is indeed
possible, we have to check whether the value of steady state, net-of-tax debt service, P,
as derived on this assumption, is in fact consistent with a positive domestic consumption
level. To check this, we can simply evaluate expression (6), using the steady state value
of P for each of the three tax regimes from the table. Generally, an equilibrium with c 1
0 can or cannot exist for each of the three types of tax regime.b A steady state with c~
0 is, ceteris paribus, more likely, the smaller is ~-~', and the larger is e f e'. Compa-
ring the values of P across the three tax regimes, it follows that a steady state with c~ 0
is feasible, for a larger range of parameter values, with joint taxation than with taxation
by one of the two countries.
For the case of c - 0, the domestic capital stock k is no longer determined, as
assumed so far, by the simple condition of g'(k) -~ as implied by (2), but the other
model ccefficients, ~', e and e', will also have an impact.' Note that the correct expressi-
ons for steady state variables are now found by replacing ], in Table 1 by g'(k). In this12
case of c- 0, it is still in the interest of the domestic tax authority, however, to tax
international lending. In fact, domestic agents use their lump sum receipt of home
country's tax revenues to service their previously contracted internationa] debt. To see
how domestic steady state capital and other variables are affected by a change in the
home country's lending opportunities, let us take the specific example of a reduction in
the foreign rate of time preference, ),'. Let us also assume that only the foreign country
taxes international lending, and let the starting point be characterized by c- 0 and by
g'(k) -~. To see how the steady state, home country, capital stock, k, is affected, we
first substitute for P from column 2 in the table into (6). Maintaining c- 0, we obtain
the following,e
dk 1
d~' g" (k) - ~e
I~l (11) the domestic capital stock, k, is shown to rise following a decline in ~'. It
follows that g'(k), declines. It can further easily be shown that g'(k) -~~` rises, as i`'
drops.9 It is now seen that the steady state values r, z, R, and P all rise following the
drop in ~'.
4. Conclusion
This paper has examined the role of international taxation in an infinite horizon model
of two countries that differ in their rates of time preference. The taxation of international
capital flows can explain that the impatient country enjoys positive consumption in steady
state. For this to occur, the optimal tax wedge on international lending has to just off set
the difference between the two countries' rates of time preference. Taxation, in effect,13
prevents the capital-exporting country from 'owning' the capital-importing country in
steady state. Due to the tax wedge, the steady state cost of capital differs in the two
countries. Such an equilibrium is more likely to exist, the smaller is the difference
between the two countries' rates of time preference, and the more sensitive is the
marginal product of capital to additional physical capital investments in either country.
T'he paper has investigated the implications of taxation for the two countries' steady
state levels of consumption for the case where countries set their tax rates noncooperative-
ly. Only in this instance can taxation bring about that both countries' consumption rates
are positive in steady state. In fact, fully cooperating countries would not levy any
distortionary taxes on international capital flows.
The basic analysis can be extended in several ways. First, the assumption of costless
international capital movements can be relaxed to allow for positive adjustment costs
associated with capital transfers between countries. Second, it would be interesting to
allow the two countries' populations and labor supplies to differ in size, or extend the
model to more than two countries. Third, it is interesting to see whether the presence of
taxation qualitatively changes the relationship between countries' (growth) rates of
consumption in infinite horizon models of endogenous growth.ta
Table 1. Steady state solutions for the three tax regimes with c~ 0.
Tax competition Only debtor Orily creditor
taxes taxes
r~ 0, r' ~ 0 r 1 0, r' - 0 r- 0, r' ~ 0
r Á - ~ ~ E ' ~ - Á ~ ~
~ E { E~ ~
r' (~ - Á~)E ~ ~ - J~~
~E t Á~E~ ~
Z i~ - Á~ i~ - Á~ i~ - Á~
ÁE t Í`~E~ Í` ~E~ ~E
R E' (), - ~')- (), - ~')1 0
E; E~ ÁE rt Á ~E~ Á~E~
R~ E (~ - ~' )'' p (~ - ~' )Z
E t E~ ÁE t A~E~ ÁE
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Endnotes
1. In the present paper, the modified golden rule is for zero population growth, but positive
population growth, as in Cass (1965), is easily incorporated.
2. Thís may not be true for the entire volume of indebtedness, as in principle a country's in
debtedness can exceed its capital stock.
3. Alternatively, one can assume that the creditor country provides a foreign tax credit for taxes
levied by the debtor nation on intemational capital flows. Bond and Samuelson (1989) have
shown, however, that in this instance all international capital flows are extinguished in Nash
equilibrium.
4. Equation (5) reflects that the rate of depreciation tax allowance equals the economic rate of
depreciation b, if international capital flows cake the form of foreign direct investment.
5. These two latter conditions imply that a measure of the tax wedge on international lending
given by (1 - r)(1 - r') from (5) equals the ratio ~~~.
6. Note that separate equilibria with c~ 0 and with c- 0 may exist.
7. It is assumed here that strictly c- 0.
8. The coefficient e is here assumed to be (locally) constant. Note that even if we compare two
steady states with zero domestic consumption, domestic consumption can be positive during
the adjustment to the new steady s[ate.
9. In particular,
á(8'(k) - ~') - ~e
e 0
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